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LEGISLATION
Abortion Legislation: The Need for Reform
I. INTRODUCTION
Widespread national publicity and recent state legislative activity1
have focused a significant degree of national concern on a serious
problem of public health and morals-the question of abortion.
Surveys indicate that between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 abortions take
place annually-or, one abortion for every four to five pregnancies. 2
The so-called "back-street abortionists," whether amateur or profes-
sional, each year cause the death of 5,000 to 10,000 women who are
forced to seek their services. 3
Because of the highly controversial nature of abortion, statutes at-
tempting to deal with the problem stubbornly resist amendment de-
spite widespread disregard of their provisions.4 Many hospitals per-
mit abortions under hospital-imposed regulations5 in open contraven-
tion of the law,6 thus subjecting the physicians involved to the risk of
1. The Association for the Study of Abortion, Inc., located in New York, reported
that abortion bills were introduced in the legislatures of 28 states during the 1967 term.
2. Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis; Therapeutic Abortion and
the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 647 (1966). Estimates of the
number of abortions performed must be given cautious weight because of the
impossibility of collecting data on the subject. The figures stated in the text are the
most often relied on and are supported only by the fact that a number of studies have
reached this same approximate figure. But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.11, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), which reported estimates from 333,000 to 2,000,000 annually.
3. Trout, Therapeutic Abortion Laws Need Therapy, 37 TEMP. L.Q. 172, 178
(1964); Comment, The Legal Status of Therapeutic Abortion, 27 U. PITT. L. REv.
669, 677 (1966). This figure is probably conservative in light of a reluctance to
record abortion as cause of death in autopsy reports. An indication of the physical
injury involved can be found in New York's Hospitals Department's report that 40%
of all gynecological admissions to municipal hospitals in 1966 were victims of
incomplete abortions. Tolchin, Two Assemblymen Clash on Abortion Law Change,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1967, at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
4. LADER, ABORTION 8 (1966).
5. The current hospital procedure has resulted in discrimination against the poor
and the non-white. A survey of New York hospitals showed that only 7% of
the abortions were performed on non-whites and that 792 private room patients
received abortions as compared with 16 ward patients. LADES, ABORTION 29 (1966).
A survey of two Buffalo hospitals revealed that 482 abortions were performed upon
private patients while only 22 clinic patients received abortions. Niswander,
Therapeutic Abortion: Indications & Technics, 28 Ons'rE-mCS & GYNECOLOGY 124
(1966). See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1967, at 23, cols. 3-4.
6. Ninety per cent of abortions performed at Mt. Sinai Hospital were not strictly
within the law. Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion: Human Hardship and Unyielding
Laws, 35 S. CAL. L. REv. 123, 126 (1962). A similar result in Buffalo hospitals is
reported in OB. GYN. NEws, Jan. 1967, at 42, col. 1.
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criminal prosecutionZ Legislation should be thoughtfully considered
which would not only remove this threat of prosecution for following
accepted medical practices but which would also provide a legally-
approved alternative in situations (1) where the physical or mental
condition of the patient indicates a need for early termination of preg-
nancy, or (2) where the patient is either mentally incompetent or a
victim of incest or rape. Support for legislative reform has been voiced
by the general public8 and by both medical and legal professions.9
The purpose of this note is to consider the religious and legal
thought which formed the bases for the present abortion statutes; to
discuss the present statutory and case law pertaining to abortions;
and to examine the various medical and legal factors indicating need
for reform.
II. REiGious AN LEGAL CONCEPTS OF LIFE
The greatest objection to legalized abortion arises from the theory
that there is "life" in the fetus which deserves the protection of the law.
7. However, there has never been a criminal prosecution of a licensed physician
performing an abortion for health reasons or fetal indications with approval of con-
curring doctors and a hospital board. Brief for Amici Curiae at 28, Shively v. Stewart,
55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65 (1966).
8. Rossi, Public Views on Abortion, Feb. 1966, at 10 (unpublished paper for
Committee on Human Development, University of Chicago):
ATrrruEs OF THE GENERAL POPULATION TO LEGAL
ABoRTioN UNDER SPECIFIED CONDITIONSa
DON'T
YES NO KNOW
1. If the woman's own health is seriously 71 26 3
endangered by the pregnancy ......
2. If she became pregnant as a result of 56 38 6
rape ... .........................
3. If there is a strong chance of serious 55 41 4
defect in the baby ...............
4. If the family has a very low income 21 77 2
and cannot afford any more children
5. If she is not married and does not 18 80 2
want to marry the man ............
6. If she is married and does not want 15 83 2
any more children ................
aQuestion read: "Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for
a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion . . ." followed by conditions specified
above. The question was put to 1,482 people.
9. Abortion law reform was recommended by the committee for the American
Medical Association at its 1965 annual convention, but final determination was left to
the individual state medical societies. On. GYN. NEWs, Jan. 1967, at 42, col. 1.
See also Niswander, Medical Abortion Practices in the United States, 17 W. REs. L.
REv. 403 (1965). The legal professions support for reform is evidenced by the
American Law Institutes MODEL PENAL CODE. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1967,
at 21.
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Since present abortion statutes are primarily based upon concepts of
religion and morality, any analysis of the law concerning abortion
must of necessity first discuss these various theories.
A. Religious Concepts
The Catholic Church has been most active as an institution in re-
sisting the recent proposals for change in the abortion laws. 10 The
policy of the Catholic Church stems from its belief that life begins
with conception; thus, abortion is considered murder of an innocent
without the sacrament of baptism and is punishable by excommuni-
cation. The Casti connubli of Pope Pius XI in 1930 stated the official
doctrine: "The life of each [mother and fetus] is equally sacred and no
one has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it.""
Under this view the Catholic Church refuses to recognize the excep-
tion12 in the present statutes permitting abortion to save the mother's
life. Even if one accepts the validity of the Catholic Church's basic
hypothesis, one may question any church's attempt to impose its re-
ligious dogma upon the entire community through its opposition to
change of today's restrictive abortion statutes. 3
Because of the diversity of viewpoints within the Jewish faith, it is
difficult to define an official Jewish position on abortion, but as early
as 1168 A.D. a treatise of Jewish law under the heading of self-
defense accepted abortion when the mother's life was in danger,14
a position expressed in most current legislation. This concept neces-
sarily accepts the premise that life begins with conception. On the
other hand, one segment of modem Jewish religious teaching views
the development of the fetus in stages, thus permitting abortion to
10. Sands, The Therapeutic Abortion Act: An Answer to the Opposition, 13 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 285, 287 (1966). See also the first pastoral letter ever issued jointly by the
bishops of New York's eight Roman Catholic dioceses calling upon parishioners to fight
the recent attempt to change New York's abortion law. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1967,
at 1, col. 3 (city ed.).
11. LADF.n, ABORTION 95 (1966).
12. One exception the Catholic Church does recognize, however, is that which is
justified by the doctrine of "dual effect," which excuses the death of a fetus incident to
the treatment of a disease. For example, if physical condition indicates the need for a
hysterectomy, the Church may permit an operation upon a pregnant woman even though
the result might be expulsion of the fetus. Sands, supra note 10, at 293.
13. "There is nothing in Catholic teaching which suggests that Catholics should write
into civil law the prescriptions of church law, or in any way force the observance of
Catholic doctrine on others." Letter from Richard Cardinal Cushing, March 19, 1963,
cited in Sands, supra note 10, at 296. In addition, there is reason to believe that a
portion of the Catholic lay population is not following this particular teaching of the
Church. Four studies show that Catholics comprise 20% of all abortion patients,
almost equal to the Catholic ratio of about 25% of the total population. LADEn,
ABORTION 7 (1966).
14. Leavy & Kummer, supra note 6, at 133.
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preserve the mother's health during the first stage and thereafter,
only to save her life.15
The position of the various Protestant denominations on abortion
is most difficult to analyze because of the lack of unity and central
doctrine. Some members of the Episcopal and Unitarian faiths (two
of the smaller denominations) have endorsed very liberal approaches
to the abortion problem.16 The National Council of Churches, rep-
resenting the major Protestant denominations, has issued a statement"
recognizing human life in the fetus, but condoning abortion in cases
involving threats to the life or health of the mother, a view more
permissive than that taken by most current statutes.
B. Legal Concepts
Is there any legal significance to the concept of "life" in the fetus?
The different areas of the law vary in their consideration of the ques-
tion. Jurisdictions also vary in the application of these considerations
to each field of law.
The intentional killing of the fetus was not recognized as homicide
at common law, but many jurisdictions have by statute established
the crime of foeticide, although there is disagreement as to the extent
of physical development which must take place before the fetus is
entitled to the protection of the law.18
Many who oppose abortion reform point to the law of property and
inheritance as recognizing the fetus as a "person" from the time of
conception. Closer analysis reveals, however, that this theory is a
legal fiction. Since the child must be born alive in order to inherit,"
these fields of law are actually recognizing only an expected life.
An extreme example illustrating that courts are not basing their de-
cisions on the fact that a fetus is a person is the case of Piper v.
Hoard,20 where plaintiff was allowed to recover land on the basis of
fraud perpetrated prior to her conception.
15. "First, the foetus is an organic part of the mother up to the moment when
labour begins, and abortion is strongly condemned on moral grounds unless justified
for medical reasons. Second, until the child's head or the greater part of its body
has emerged, its life is of inferior value, and its claim to life must be set aside in the
mother's interest if the child and not some illness threatens her life. Third, when the
major part of the child is born, it assumes human status, and the value of its life is
almost equal to that of any adult person." Trout, supra note 3, at 176.
16. LAnER, ABORTION 99-100 (1966).
17. Trout, supra note 3, at 176.
18. For example, in New York foeticide is manslaughter while the killing of a born
child is murder, Gilpin v. Gilpin, 197 Misc. 319, 94 N.Y.S.2d 706, (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1950);
Georgia distinguishes between a misdemeanor and murder at the time of quickening.
Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). See generally 40 G.J.S,
Homicide §§ 38, 65, 66 (1944).
19. 4 H. TFA.Nv, REAL PRoPERTY § 1127 (3d ed. 1939).
20. 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887). H acquired land from F but induced plain-
tiffs mother to marry F representing that F owned the land and that their issue would
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The recent trend in the law of torts allowing a cause of action for
prenatal injuries has been interpreted as legal recognition of the exis-
tence of a human personality in the fetus. Although a majority of
jurisdictions now permit recovery for prenatal torts, there is no una-
nimity with regard to the rationale utilized in granting the remedy
or the conditions necessary for recovery.21 The landmark case of
Montreal Tramways Co. v. Lveill6,2 allowed compensation to a child
for a prenatal injury resulting in a life-long deformity. The court's
emphasis upon the life-long deformity implies that birth was a pre-
requisite to recovery. Other courts adhere to a "biological" theory
that life begins upon conception in order to allow recovery of damages
even if the child is still-bom.3 Under either theory the courts seem
to be more interested in providing a remedy for a clearly wrongful
act than they are in the theoretical question of the beginning of life.24
The concept of therapeutic abortion is not irreconcilable with this
trend permitting recovery in tort. First, it should be noted that in the
tort cases the interest of the mother and child coincide; whereas in
abortion cases the interests of the two are antagonistic. Second, one
of the underlying reasons for the development of this cause of action
was an advancement of medical knowledge that facilitated proof of
the causal relationship; other developments in medical technology
make it possible to perform a safe abortion. Finally, with regard to
the Montreal Tramways line of cases, one must note that the right of
a child to recover damages for an injury sustained before birth does
not necessarily imply a right to be born.
Of special note is the recent development toward a new tort action
which may be labelled "wrongful life." In the case of Zepeda v.
Zepeda,5 an illegitimate child sued his natural father for fraudulently
inducing his mother to have sexual relations without informing her
that he was married, and claimed damages for the disadvantages of
illegitimacy. The court was willing to find that a tort had been com-
mitted, but denied relief because of difficulty in assessing damages
inherit it. Plaintiff's mother married F and plaintiff was conceived and born. The
court held that defendant H would have to convey the land to plaintiff.
21. See Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MICH. L. l.v. 579, 580 (1965).
22. [1933] 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
23. Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 224 A.2d 406 (1966).
24. As the New Jersey Supreme Court once noted, "The semantic argument whether
an unborn child is 'a person in being' seems to us to be beside the point. There is
no question that conception sets in motion biological processes which if undisturbed
wil produce what every one will concede to be a person in being. If in the meanwhile
those processes can be disrupted resulting in harm to the child when born, it is im-
material whether before birth the child is considered a person in being. And regard-
less of analogies to other areas of the law, justice requires that the principle be recog-
nized that a child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body."
Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
25. 41 II. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
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and fear that such a decision would unmanageably increase litiga-
tion.26 In a more recent case the New York Court of Claims held that
an illegitimate child had a cause of action against the state for negli-
gently allowing the child's mother, an inmate in a state mental hos-
pital, to be attacked by a male patient, an assault which resulted in
the child's conception z Although this particular decision was later
reversed, 8 the developments in this area may suggest two arguments
supporting legalized therapeutic abortion. First, it may indicate that
the law of torts seeks to provide a remedy for a wrong rather than
to determine whether there is life in the fetus, since the "wrongful
life" tort actually occurs before conception. Second, if the courts
recognize that birth under these circumstances is a wrong, an alterna-
tive may be to disallow birth in this situation, thereby giving judicial
sanction to abortion. However, a more reasonable interpretation of
allowing a wrongful life action is that the court reasons that life is al-
ways a benefit, but that damages should be allowed so as to compen-
sate the child for the difference between leading a normal life and
an abnormal one.29
Discussion of the various approaches toward legal recognition of
a human personality in the fetus logically leads to the ultimate ques-
tion: Does the fetus have a constitutional right to be born?30 This
precise question has never been presented to the courts despite the
fact that many present statutes allow abortion under some circum-
stances. At least one decision seems to indicate that the unborn child
has some rights.31 In that case a pregnant woman rejected blood trans-
fusions on religious grounds, but upon the hospital's request the court
ordered the transfusion to protect the unborn child. Although the
court's opinion was not framed in constitutional terms, such an argu-
ment is implicit in its holding. Not only does the case seem to imply
a constitutional right to be born, but this right seems to supersede
the mother's freedom of religion and right to privacy. The case might
not be the best precedent for establishing a constitutional right be-
26. Id. at 262-63, 190 N.E.2d at 859.
27. Williams v. State, 46 Misc. 2d 824, 260 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct. Cl. 1965). The child
claimed damages for the disadvantages of illegitimacy, deprivation of property rights
and loss of parental care. Id. at 825, 260 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
28. Williams v. State, 25 App. Div. 2d 906, 269 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1966).
29. In the recent New Jersey case of Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d
689 (1967), the court refused a child born deformed recovery against two doctors
who allegedly told the mother that her infection with German measles would not
affect the development of the child. With reference to the tort of "wrongful life" the
court said: "The infant plaintiff would have us measure the difference betveen his life
with defects against the utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such
a determination." 227 A.2d at 692.
30. If in fact the fetus is a legal person entitled to constitutional protection, there
remains the question of the nature of this protection.
31. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert.
denfed, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
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cause the peculiar circumstances may have caused the court to voice
the child's rights in an effort to save the woman from herself. De-
spite the holding, this case is not completely inconsistent with con-
cepts of therapeutic abortion since both give legal sanction to ac-
cepted medical practice.m
The Supreme Court of New Jersey was recently presented with the
abortion problem in a malpractice suit by the parents- of a deformed
child against two doctors who allegedly did not inform the woman
that her infection with German measles created a danger that her
child might be born deformed, or that it might be possible to obtain
an abortion. The court sustained the dismissal of the complaint stat-
ing: "When the parents say their child should not have been born,
they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in
being the mother and father of a defective child."4 Although the
court did not rule on the constitutionality of abortion, it did state:
"The right to life is inalienable in our society,"3 5 and "we firmly believe
the right of their child to live is greater than and precludes their right
not to endure emotional and financial injury."38 Both of these state-
ments suggest a constitutional right to be born.
The present abortion statutes37 give little indication that the fetus
is a person entitled to any legal rights. While at one time the ob-
jective of statutes forbidding abortion may have been protection of
the unborn child, today's statutes emphasize protecting the mother
from the danger of "back street abortionists,"38 as evidenced by the
fact that many jurisdictions hold that the woman obtaining the abor-
tion is neither a felon nor an accomplice. 39 In addition, many of the
abortion statutes do not require death of the fetus,40 or even that the
woman be in fact pregnant,41 in order to convict the abortionist.
In addition to the legal status of the fetus, consideration must be
given to the rights of the mother to seek therapeutic abortion. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,2 the Court held an anti-contraceptive statute
unconstitutional as an invastion of privacy. The majority opinion
32. Id. at 423, 201 A.2d at 538. "The blood transfusion . .. may be administered
... as the physician in charge at the time may determine."
33. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, supra note 29. The case involved two causes of action:
one brought by the child discussed in footnote 29 and another brought by the parents
discussed in the above text.
34. 227 A.2d at 693.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See notes 50-52, 58-61, 63, 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
38. Leavy & Kummer, supra note 6, at 134.
39. See, e.g., Seifert v. State, 160 Ind. 464, 67 N.E. 100 (1903); State v. Smith, 99
Iowa 26, 68 N.W. 428 (1896).
40. Dougherty v. People, 1 Colo. 514 (1872).
41. Schoenen v. Board of Medical Examiners, 54 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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stated that the statute "operates directly on an intimate relation of
husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect of that
relation."4 The contraception problem is remarkably analogous to
that of abortion 4 and similar reasoning might well be applied in
support of legalized abortion. The major distinction, of course, is
that in the latter the conception has already taken place. Thus, the
only generally accepted right of the mother to secure an abortion is
to protect her own life.45
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE LAW
Only one state statute prohibits abortion without exception, 46 while
the great majority of states permit abortion where necessary to save
the woman's life.47 None of these statutes defines the term "life" and
interpretation has been left to the courts. The weight of authority
requires the prosecution to prove that the abortion was not necessary
to save her life, but this burden may be easily met by the woman's
testimony that she was in good health before the operation.48 More
recently, however, a California court indicated that this testimony
alone would not be sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
that the woman's life was not in danger.49
The statutes of Massachusetts,50 Pennsylvania5 and New Jersey5
prohibit only "unlawful" abortions, again leaving the task of interpre-
43. Id. at 482.
44. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 Micr. L. REv. 219 (1965).
45. See note 47 infra and accompanying text. Furthermore, advances in medical
science place the physician in a difficult position with regard to abortion. In the past,
courts have not only recognized the doctor's right to practice his profession, but have
also required the doctor to exercise his skill in conformity with medically accepted
practices for the betterment of his patient. See United States v. One Package, 86 F.2d
737 (2d Cir. 1936), where the court reversed the conviction of a doctor for violation
of the Comstock Act prohibiting the mailing of any item for contraception or for
causing abortion. The court said the Act's design "was not to prevent the importation,
sale, or carriage by mail of things which might intelligently be employed by con-
scientious and competent physicians for the purpose of saving life or promoting the
well-being of their patients." Id. at 739. Another federal court has held that a statute
enacted during Prohibition which restricted physicians in prescribing alcohol was
unconstitutional as infringing "upon the duty of the physician to prescribe in accord
with his honest judgment . United States v. Freund, 290 F. 411, 414 (D. Mont.
1923).
46. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (1950).
47. Sands, supra note 10, at 310. Since the date of this article, several states have
enacted new legislation. These statutes are cited at notes 65-68 infra.
48. People v. Galardo, 41 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 257 P.2d 29, 32 (1953).
49. People v. Ballard, 167 Cal. App. 2d 803, 814, 335 P.2d 204, 211 (1959). "[tIt
is not a rare occurrence for a person who has gone to a doctor's office in apparently
reasonably good health, only to learn from the doctor that he is inflicted with a fatal
disease. Every presumption is in favor of the defendant's innocence."
50. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, § 19 (1956).
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4718 (1963).
52. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (1953).
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tation to the courts. In Rex v. Bourne,m a classic interpretation of a
similar statute, the court instructed the jury that the question of un-
lawfulness turned on whether the operation was performed in order
to save the life of the woman, and that:
[Tihose words ought to be construed in a reasonable sense, and, if the doctor
is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, that the
probable consequences of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make
the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor . . . is operating for the purpose of preserving the life
of the mother.54
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in Commonwealth v.
Brunelle,55 interpreted the term "unlawful" to allow a physician to
perform an abortion where he has exercised his honest judgment in
deciding that the abortion is necessary to save the woman's life or
health, provided his decision conforms to the general opinion of
competent practitioners in the community.56 The New Jersey court in
Gleitman v. Cosgrove5 7 pointed out that the courts of that state have
interpreted the statutory language of "without lawful justification" to
require that the woman's life be in danger, but added that a doctor
may perform an abortion upon a good faith determination in accor-
dance with medically accepted standards and not be guilty of a crime.
Alabama,5 8 New Mexico59 and the District of Columbia 0 have ex-
pressly provided by statute that an abortion may be performed not
only to save the life of the mother but also to preserve her health
or protect her from serious bodily injury. In Maryland 6' an abortion
may be performed where no other method will secure the safety of
the mother. Although there has been no ruling on the scope of the
term "safety," the Attorney General of Maryland has stated that "safe-
ty" means "health."62 Most of these statutes apply irrespective of the
amount of medical training or professional status of the actor. Some
states, however, either by statute63 or through court interpretation64
have established a different standard for the practicing physician.
53. [1939] 1 K.B. 687.
54. Id. at 693-94 (emphasis added).
55. 341 Mass. 675, 171 N.E.2d 850 (1961).
56. Id. at 677, 171 N.E.2d at 851-52.
57. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
58. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 9 (1958).
59. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-5-3 (1953).
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1961).
61. MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 3 (1957).
62. THERAPEunc AiOanON 182 (Rosen ed. 1954).
63. LA. REv. STAT. § 37:1285 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 677.190 (1965).
64. In Illinois it has been held that there is a presumption of necessity in the case
of an abortion by a licensed physician. People v. Davis, 362 II. 417, 200 N.E. 334
(1936). This principle was also cited by a California court in People v. Ballard, 167
Cal. App. 2d 803, 335 P.2d 204 (1959). Washington has established a test of whether
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In the past year the movement for legislative reform has met with
some success in several states. A new law was enacted in Mississippi
65
permitting abortion in cases where the pregnancy resulted from rape,
but making no provisions regarding the determination of the au-
thenticity of the alleged rape. The 1967 California statute 6 permits
abortions performed by a licensed physician in an accredited hospital
upon unanimous approval of a special hospital board in cases where
either the life or the physical or mental health of the woman is in
danger. Abortions may also be granted in cases of rape or incest upon
the certification of the district attorney after establishing probable
cause. A recent North Carolina statute67 goes one step further in
allowing abortion where there is substantial risk that the child would
be born with "grave" physical or mental deformity. The North Caro-
lina act, however, requires that the applicant have been a resident
for the four months preceding the operation and replaces the hospital
committee provision with a requirement that two other doctors certify
that the circumstances justify an abortion. The much publicized
Colorado statute, like the one in California, provides for unanimous
approval by a hospital committee and has no residency requirement.
The statute includes the life and health of both the mother and child
as justification for abortion, but requires that the injury, whether
physical or mental, be both grave and permanent.
IV. MEDICAL-LEGAL INDICATIONS
Before suggesting new legislation one must examine the various
medical and legal indications which justify abortion.
A. Physical Indications
Physical indications, including tuberculosis, heart and kidney dis-
ease,69 have been considered sufficient justification even under those
current statutes permitting abortion to save the life of the mother.
Recent advances in medical science, however, have diminished the
the operation would be recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in their
profession practicing in the same community. State v. Powers, 155 Wash. 63, 283 P.
439 (1929). In view of the statutory provision for revocation of a physician's license,
the Oregon court has held that a doctor is not subject to the criminal statute. State v.
Buck, 200 Ore. 87, 262 P.2d 495 (1953). The Massachusetts courts have recognized
a distinction when the abortion is performed by a physician when his judgment con-
formed to that of fellow practitioners. Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 341 Mass. 675,
171 N.E.2d 850 (1961). Even in the classic case of Rex v. Bourne, [1939] 1 K.B.
687, the judge indicated that a non-physician would not be entitled to the instruction
he gave the jury.
65. Miss. CODE ANN. § 2223 (1942), as amended, H.B. No. 562 (1966 session).
66. CAL. HEALTHr & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (added by S.B. No. 462 (1967)).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-44 (1965), as amended, S.B. No. 104 (May 9, 1967).
68. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (added by H.B. No. 1426 (1967)).
69. For a full discussion of the physical indications for a therapeutic abortion see
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significance of physical indications since it is now possible with
proper care and treatment to, carry almost all pregnancies to full
term.70 These indications seem' to be limited to the direct physical
effect of the pregnancy and the delivery, and only by broad interpre-
tation could they include the long-term effect resulting from the strain
on the mother's health caused by rearing another child. For example,
a woman with a serious heart disease may go to term with extensive
care and confinement to bed for the entire pregnancy, but she would
be unable to provide adequately for the child or perform any of the
maternal duties of raising the child.
B. Psychiatric Indications
In recent years psychiatric indications have played a proportionately
greater role in the justification of abortion.71 Most of the recent re-
form attempts have included mental health as an indication for abor-
tion, but there seems to be no agreement even within the medical
profession as to the precise relationship of abortion to mental and
emotional health. First, there is a split between psychiatrists as to
whether there is ever a psychiatric justification for abortion.72 Even
among those who recognize psychiatric indications there are wide
differences in attitudes and practices. In one survey a great majority
of those favoring psychiatric indications recognized such need in
cases of psychosis or where suicidal tendencies appear.73 Technically,
even those statutes allowing abortions only to save the life of the
mother should be construed to allow the abortion of a suicidal woman
since refusal, in effect, could mean her death. There seems to be
general acceptance, however, that suicidal risk is minimal.7 4 The
greater threat is said to lie with those women who state that if
refused a therapeutic abortion they will abort themselves.7 s The
survey also indicated that a large proportion of psychiatrists also
favor abortion for patients with a history of severe postpartum or
antecedent mental illness.76 In one sense it would seem useful to
require an antecedent history of mental illness, since abortion is one
Quay, Justifiable Abortion-Medical and Legal Foundations, 49 GEo. L.J. 173, 185-220
(1960).
70. Trout, supra note 3, at 180; Comment, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv. 669, 674 (1966).
71. Niswander, supra note 5, at 125. A study of two Buffalo hospitals showed that
psychiatric indications accounted for 10% of the abortions in 1943, whereas in 1964,
85% of the abortions were performed with psychiatric justifications.
72. Anderson, Psychiatric Indications for the Termination of Pregnancy, 13 WoILD
Mm. J. 81 (1966).
73. Rosenberg & Silver, Suicide, Psychiatrists & Therapeutic Abortion, 102 CAL.
MEDIcINE 407, 408 (1965).
74. Id. at 409.
75. Anderson, supra note 72, at 82.
76. Rosenberg & Silver, supra note 73, at 408.
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area in which the woman stands to gain by deceiving the psy-
chiatrist.7 7 Psychiatric indications for abortion may be created by
eugenic indications concerning the child. The chance that a child
will be born deformed may raise such fear in the mother that her
mental health will be jeopardized. Similarly, the mental well-being
of the mother might also be disturbed in a pregnancy resulting from
a brutal rape.
However, there is difficulty in separating purely psychiatric con-
siderations from those of social significance. For instance, a woman
from a low income group who has several children and perhaps no
husband is likely to have mental and emotional repercussions if forced
to go through with a current pregnancy. The same reasoning might
also apply to the young single girl who becomes pregnant, and who,
due to mental immaturity, or the adverse effect of the illegitimate
child upon her home life, might become mentally unbalanced if re-
fused an abortion2
8
Finally, there is a split within the profession concerning the
emotional after-effects of abortion. One group believes post-abortion
psychiatric illness rarely occurs and is mild in those cases in which
it does occur.79 Although guilt feelings may result in some cases, this
group believes that refusal would only worsen the mental state.80 At
the opposite pole is a group headed by a Swedish doctor, Martin
Ekblad, who concluded that the greater the psychiatric indications
for an abortion, the greater is the risk of unfavorable psychic after
effects.81
C. Eugenic Indications
A third indication for therapeutic abortion involves the possibility
that the child will be born deformed as a result of disease, drug or
injury. The birth of a deformed child places a financial and emotional
burden upon the parents in addition to the emotional effect upon the
child forced to live with the handicap. In many cases these children
must be institutionalized at the expense of the state. The most notable
example of a eugenic abortion is the case in which the mother con-
77. Tredgold, Psychiatric Indications for Termination of Pregnancy, 2 LANCET 1251,
1252 (1964). Some hospitals already require that the patient have a history of acute
mental illness treated at that institution. LADER, ABORTION 25 (1966).
78. The study of the two Buffalo hospitals showed that one-half of the abortions
for psychiatric indications were performed upon young unwed girls. Niswander, supra
note 5, at 126.
79. Kummer, Post-Abortion Psychiatric Illness-A Myth? 119 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY
980 (1963); Tredgold, supra note 77, at 1253.
80. Anderson, supra note 72, at 82.
81. LADmn, ABonoN 22 (1966); Comment, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 283, 289-90
(1965).
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tracts German measles during the early months of pregnancy, a situa-
tion accounting for the second highest indication for therapeutic
abortion a2 The chances of a seriously deformed child are estimated
at between fifteen and twenty percent when the mother has con-
tracted the disease in the first trimester. 3 If the disease is contracted
in the first month, the chances of deformity are as high as eighty-five
per cent.84 These figures refer only to the possibility of serious
deformity. The figures including both serious and minor deformities
are substantially higher.8 Since there is no way of knowing which
child will have the serious deformity it is urged that parents and
doctors should not be forced to take the chance.
Voluntary sterilization laws in 28 states86 and the laws against
incest 7 reflect a present legal recognition of the dangers of hereditary
deformities, both mental and physical. It seems reasonable to expect
this same awareness when considering reform measures in therapeutic
abortion.
D. Procedure for Determination
Proposal for reform of the abortion laws should establish some
procedure for a case-by-case determination of the advisability of
performing an abortion for the above-mentioned medical indications.
A typical legislature should be less reluctant to pass reform legislation
that contains proper safeguards against abuse. The most liberal
procedure is that proposed by the Model Penal Code requiring
certification by the attending physician and attestion by one other
physician. 8 A more cautious approach has been taken by hospitals
throughout the country89 which have established committees of staff
members9 to consider each case presented and to vote, either
unanimously or by majority, to grant an abortion. Although this
procedure has been criticized as overly conservative, 91 a partial ex-
planation may be found in the fact that these committees realize that
82. Niswander, supra note 5.
83. Horstmann, Rubella and the Rubella Syndrome, 102 CAL. MEDICINE 397 (1965).
84. B. DIcINs, ABORTION AND T=E LAw 136 (1966).
85. D. REID, A TExTBooK OF OBSTETRICS 901 (1962).
86. Trout, supra note 3, at 179 n.27.
87. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 285 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-705 (1956).
88. MODE PENAL CODE § 230.3(3) (Official Draft, 1962). Three states now require
the advice of one physician, and six states require the advice of two. Trout, supra note
3, at 183.
89. LADEn, ABORTION 24-27 (1966).
90. One proposal for membership of an abortion committee would include permanent
representatives of four hospital divisions: Obstetrics, Surgical, Medical, and Psychiatric.
Interview with Donald A. Goss, M.D., Professor and Chairman of the Department of
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine, in Nashville,
Tenn., Feb. 20, 1967 [hereinafter cited as Interview].
91. LADER, ABORTION 26-27 (1966).
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they are operating outside the law.92 Once reform legislation is
passed sanctioning the various medical indications and giving legal
recognition to the hospital committee, a case-by-case determination
can be made more objectively and without restraint.
E. Humanitarian Indications
There would seem to be little to gain in forcing the victim of
rape to carry and give birth to an unwanted child, the reminder of
her horrible experience. Although pregnancy rarely results from
rape,93 it is the duty of the law to provide for such an eventuality.
The major practical problem is the opportunity for fraudulent asser-
tions by women seeking an abortion. Thus a means of determination
must be developed to show that the woman was in fact raped and
that the rape caused the pregnancy. Since rape is not a medical
indication, the determination should be made within the legal
structure. The customary criminal process of capturing the attacker,
bringing him to trial, proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
and providing him with means to appeal his conviction will be inade-
quate in the abortion proceeding because of the time element. Once
the rape has occurred, pregnancy cannot be easily diagnosed until
approximately two weeks after the woman's first missed menstrual
period.94 Once the diagnosis of pregnancy has been established, the
decision of the abortion committee should be made promptly, so that
the operation may still be safely performed.9 5 Two of the recent
statutes call for a determination by the district attorney.9 6 Another
suggestion is an ex parte hearing before a judge, or if the attacker
can be found, a non-jury civil trial with the decision based upon a
preponderance of the evidence.97 This judicial determination will
help to eliminate the possibility of fraud. The fact that the woman
reports the rape to the authorities before she knows that she is
pregnant will also help to negate an allegation of fraud on her part.98
92. Since no other medical procedure requires the approval of a committee, id. at
27, it has been suggested that the committees were established as a protection against
the possibilities of prosecution. Trout, supra note 3, at 184.
93. DxciENs, supra note 84.
94. REm, supra note 85, at 222.
95. Williams, Euthanasia and Abortion, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 178, 193 (1966).
Actually, pregnancy may be terminated safely at any time; only the method differs.
Interview, supra note 90.
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (added by S.B. No. 462 (1967)); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (added by H.B. No. 1426 (1967)).
97. The result of this proceeding will have no effect upon the subsequent criminal
trial for rape. This position is taken by the new California bill, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 25950 (added by S.B. No. 462 (1967)).
98. The new North Carolina legislation requires that the woman report the rape
within seven days of the act. N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-14 (1965), as amended, S.B. No.
104 (May 9, 1967).
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The court or district attorney must not only judge the credibility of
the woman's allegation of rape, but must also determine that the
pregnancy resulted from the rape and not from an act of consensual
intercourse taking place at approximately the same time. This latter
judgment will also turn on the credibility of the participants, since it
is medically impossible to judge the precise time of conception while
the woman is still carrying the child.9 9 A similar legal process should
also be utilized in cases involving incest or incompetency.
A further question concerns the applicability of these standards to
cases of "statutory rape," a term applied to those statutes proscribing
intercourse with an unmarried girl under a stated age'0° even though
consent is given. The rationale of these statutes lies in the belief
that until a certain stage of development a girl is not mature
enough to know the consequences of giving consent; thus by necessity
and for the protection of the girl from herself, the legislature must
arbitrarily set an age. It would be inconsistent for the law to set an
age at which a girl is incapable of consenting and punish her partner
but to refuse an abortion to this same girl. However, the public fear
that such a measure would promote promiscuity in young women
would make passage of such a proposal difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for legislatures to bring the abortion statutes
into conformity with modem medical practice and with the changing
attitudes of the public. The moral and theoretical questions concern-
ing abortion will remain unanswerable, but this debate should not
prevent legislatures from providing access to appropriate medical care
for those who desire it.
Proposals for reform legislation should provide for abortion not only
to save the mother's life, but also to preserve her health-both physical
and mental,1 1 and for cases where there is substantial risk 12 that
the child will be born with a grave deformity. These provisions should
apply only to abortions performed in a hospital by a licensed physician
with the approval of a hospital board. The criminal prohibition should
be retained for all abortions performed by non-physicians. Women
impregnated by rapists should also be entitled to a legal abortion
after a judicial determination of the validity of the woman's allega-
99. Interview, supra note 90.
100. MODEL Pa AL CODE § 207.4 (10), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). The
established ages range from 7 to 21 with most states choosing either 16 or 18.
101. In addition to the effects of the pregnancy upon health, consideration should
also be given to the health hazards of raising the child if an abortion is denied.
102. "Substantial risk" should be given a liberal interpretation because of the
impossibility of determining during pregnancy whether the child will be deformed and
the nature of the deformity.
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tions. Public opinion may prevent the application of these standards
to cases of statutory rape, but a proper compromise would be to permit
an abortion for any pregnant, unwed girl under the age of fourteen
or fifteen.
10 3
It is not suggested that these proposals will completely eliminate
the "back-street abortionist."1 04 The better solution to the problem
of unwanted pregnancy is broad distribution of effective contracep-
tives. This would leave legal abortion as the solution both for those
who actually desire children, but due to events intervening between
conception and birth find it unwise to carry the pregnancy to termi-
nation, as well as for those who are unable to make any choice-
victims of rape or incest, and the mentally incompetent.
103. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25950 (added by S.B. No. 462 (1967))
(fourteen); COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-2-50 (added by H.B. No. 1426 (1967)) (fifteen).
104. It has been estimated that 90% of the criminal abortions are performed
on married women seeking relief for social and economic reasons, subjects not provided
for in this suggested legislation. Roemer, Due Process and Organized Health Services,
79 PuBLnc HEALTH REPORTS 664, 667 (1964). Liberal abortion laws in the Scandinavian
countries have not eliminated the serious problem of criminal abortions. Leavy &
Kummer, supra note 6, at 136. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1967, at 23, col. 7.
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